Sustainability of Latin American Fiscal Deficits: A Panel Data Approach by Jacobo Campo Robledo & Luis Fernando Melo Velandia
 - Bogotá - Colombia - Bogotá - Colombia - Bogotá - Colombia - Bogotá - Colombia - Bogotá - Colombia - Bogotá - Colombia - Bogotá - Colombia - Bogotá - Colombia - Bogotá -SUSTAINABILITY OF LATIN AMERICAN FISCAL DEFICITS: A PANEL DATA
APPROACH|
Jacobo Campo Robledo?
Luis Fernando Melo Velandia†
ABSTRACT. This paper evaluates the ﬁscal sustainability hypothesis for eight Latin American
countriesfortheperiod1960-2009: Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, Paraguay
and Uruguay. Using second generation cointegration panel data models, we test whether govern-
ment revenues and primary expenditures are sustainable in the long run. This methodology allows
for cross-sectional dependence among countries and is appropriate under the existence of potential
structural breaks. We found empirical evidence of sustainability of the primary deﬁcit for these
Latin American countries but only in a weak sense.
Keywords: Fiscal Sustainability, Panel Unit Root tests, Panel Cointegration tests, Structural
Change.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C22, C23, H62.
1. INTRODUCTION
Fiscal sustainability or how solvent a government is over time, has been the focus of many sur-
veys during the last decades. This is a highly relevant topic because the control of ﬁscal deﬁcits
involves sustainable development and economic growth. In addition, political decisions regarding
the control of ﬁscal deﬁcits inﬂuence government expenditures and revenues, and have large ef-
fects on macroeconomic variables such as national savings and investments, and therefore, on the
current account.
One good example of the relevance of the ﬁscal deﬁcit is the Maastricht treaty. In 1991, European
Union countries (EU) signed this treaty to unify their economic policies. The basic convergence
criteria were inﬂation, exchange rate, nominal interest, debt and ﬁscal deﬁcit. The treaty stated
that a government’s deﬁcit and public debt should not be higher than 3% and 60% of the country’s
GDP, respectively. By the end of 1999, European Monetary Union (EMU) countries had already
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accomplished the treaty’s agreed-upon goals. From the empirical point of view, the recent world
crisis has pointed out the importance of using econometric methodologies that consider structural
breaks.
However, most Latin American governments have endeavored to maintain consumers’ conﬁdence
in the economy. For this purpose, they have attempted to guarantee ﬁscal sustainability. This
requires governments to adopt responsible ﬁscal policies to assure macroeconomic stability. Fur-
thermore, ﬁscal sustainability has become a focus of increasing interest because of the adoption of
ﬁscal rules by some Latin American governments.
The ﬁscal sustainability hypothesis implies that government revenues and expenditures must share
a long run trend. Although there is plentiful evidence that supports this hypothesis, there is also
evidence of the non-existence of ﬁscal sustainability. The latter is primarily due to the importance
of government expenditures as political instruments; it is also related to the difﬁculties that some
countries experience when trying to fund government expenditures with their current revenues.
In the empirical literature on this topic, Hakkio and Rush [1991] and Haug [1991] used non-panel
methodologies to demonstrate ﬁscal sustainability. These surveys used the cointegration test de-
veloped by Engle and Granger [1987]. Given the strong links among the economies of a region,
a panel approach is more appropriate in this context. Prohl and Schneider [2006], Afonso [2007]
and Afonso and Rault [2010], among others, have used macroeconomic panel methodologies.
This paper’s contribution is two-fold. First, it applies recent econometric methodologies related to
unit root (Hadri and Rao [2008]) and cointegration tests (Westerlund [2006]). These are second-
generation macroeconomic panel data tests, which correct with the cross-sectional dependence
among individuals and are additionally appropriate under the existence of structural breaks. Sec-
ond, it contributes to the empirical literature on ﬁscal sustainability for Latin America, a topic that
has attracted the attention of several researchers since the middle of the last decade.
Theoutlineofthisarticleisasfollows: thesecondsectiondescribestheeconomicandeconometric
background associated with the sustainability hypothesis. The empirical results are shown in the
third section. Finally, concluding remarks are presented in the fourth section.
2. SUSTAINABILITY HYPOTHESIS
In this section, the model proposed by Hakkio and Rush [1991] is described. This model focuses
on the government’s Intertemporal Budget Constraint (IBC).
2.1. Theoretical Model. Hakkio and Rush [1991] use a dynamic model in which the government
faces a budget constraint in period t, which is expressed in nominal terms as follows:
Eit +(1+nit)Bi;t 1 = Rit +Bit; (1)
where Bit is the public debt for country i in period t; Rit represents the central government rev-
enues, including those from seigniorage; nit is the nominal interest rate and Eit represents centralSUSTAINABILITY OF LATIN AMERICAN FISCAL DEFICITS 3
government expenditures, not including debt interest debts. Dividing (1) by the nominal GDP of















where wit is the nominal GDP growth rate. Equation (2) can be written as follows:
eit +(1+rit)bit 1 = rit +bit: (3)
Lowercase letters represent real terms variables in equation (1), rit corresponds to central govern-
ment revenues, bit is public debt, eit is central government expenditures and rit is the interest rate
adjusted by the GDP growth rate (wit). Equation (3) is, therefore, rewritten as follows:
bit  bit 1 = eit  rit +ritbit 1 = Dbit: (4)
Equation (4) represents the global balance, whereas eit  rit is the primary balance.





Etd j+1(ri;t+j  ei;t+j)+Etd j+1bi;t+j; (5)





. Equation (5) shows a relevant condition to achieve ﬁscal sustainability
of the countries. The ﬁrst term of the right-hand side of equation (5) implies ﬁscal or monetary
dominance because it represents the monetary and ﬁscal policy targets of the central government.
The right-hand side of the equation is fundamental to this survey because it is associated with the
transversality condition, which determines whether the hypothesis of sustainability holds.
The transversality condition (or solvency condition) states that the public debt can not increase
faster than the economy, and therefore, avoids forcing the central government to face a Ponzi
problem. As a result, to achieve the transversality condition, the public debt must increase more
slowly than the mean of the interest rate
lim
j!¥
Etd j+1bi;t+j = 0: (6)





Etd j+1(ri;t+j  ei;t+j): (7)
Equation (7) implies that policies are only sustainable if the sum the of the discounted primary
ﬁscal surplus (present value) equals the gross debt. Given that these series are I(1), Hakkio and
Rush [1991] showed that for IBC to hold, the central government’s revenues and expenditures
1A discussion of this assumption can be found in Hakkio and Rush [1991] and Quintos [1995].4 JACOBO CAMPO - LUIS F. MELO
need to be cointegrated.
2.2. Empirical Methodology. In general, there are three methodologies used to test the sustain-
abilityhypothesisintheempiricalliterature. Theﬁrstconsistsofdeterminingthestationarityofthe
budget deﬁcit by applying unit root tests (Hamilton and Flavin [1986], Wilcox [1989], Holmes,
Otero, and Panagiotidis [2010]). A stationarity result entails that the sustainability hypothesis
holds, whereas a non-stationarity result implies the opposite. Given that revenues and expendi-
tures are non-stationary, the second methodology consists of testing the cointegration between
these variables (Hakkio and Rush [1991], Quintos [1995], Bravo and Carrion-i Silvestre [2002],
Ehrhart and Llorca [2008], Afonso and Rault [2010], Westerlund and Prohl [2010]). If the series
are cointegrated, the sustainability hypothesis holds. The ﬁnal method also tests cointegration,
but it uses the public debt and primary budget deﬁcits when both series are non-stationary (Haug
[1991], MacDonald [1992], Prohl and Schneider [2006]).
The empirical strategy of this survey is as follows: ﬁrst, Hadri and Rao [2008]’s unit root test is
applied to revenues and primary expenditures. Second, if these series turn out to be integrated of
order 1, Westerlund [2006]’s methodology is applied to test for cointegration and estimate the long
run relationship between them. This relationship can be described as follows:
rit = ai+bieit +eit: (8)
Hakkio and Rush [1991] showed that if the variables are cointegrated, the government budget
constraint holds. Quintos [1995] not only considers whether the series are cointegrated, but also
considers the magnitude of the long run coefﬁcient. Quintos claims that bi = 1 is a sufﬁcient con-
dition for ﬁscal sustainability to hold in the strong sense. Furthermore, she argues that 0 < b < 1
implies sustainability in the weak sense and that, therefore, the government is spending more than
it is collecting.
2.2.1. Hadry and Rao’s unit root test in a heterogeneous panel with a structural break and cross-
sectional dependence. Hadri and Rao [2008] consider the following four models to test for a unit
root on the series yit:
Model 0: yit = ai+rit +diDit +eit; (9)
Model 1: yit = ai+rit +diDit +bit +eit; (10)
Model 2: yit = ai+rit +bit +gidiDTit +eit; (11)
Model 3: yit = ai+rit +diDit +bit +gidiDTit +eit; (12)
where rit is a random walk process without drift, rit = rit 1+uit, i = 1;:::;N and t = 1;:::;T. The
error terms uit and eit are i:i:d: and mutually independent. Dit and DTit are dummies associated
with the structural breaks. Model 0 is the most restrictive because it only includes a structural
break in levels and has no deterministic trend. In contrast, Model 1 includes a structural break in
levels and has a deterministic trend but does not present a trend with breaks. Model 2 allows forSUSTAINABILITY OF LATIN AMERICAN FISCAL DEFICITS 5
breaks in the trend, but not at the level of the series, to exist. Finally, Model 3, the least restrictive,
includes level, trend and break in both deterministic components.
The dummy variables Dit and DTit are deﬁned as follows:
Dit =
(





t  TB;i if t > TB;i
0 otherwise;
(14)
where TB;i = wiT denotes the break point for the i-th individual and wi 2 (0;1).
The panel statistics for testing the unit root are provided by:
















In the previous equations, the subscript k denotes the four models considered by Hadri and Rao
[2008] (k = 0;1;2;3), b wi = argminwi2(0;1)SSR(wi), Sit is the partial sum of residuals ˆ eit and ˆ s2
e;i is



















d ! N(0;1); (17)
where xk = 1
N å
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i;k are the mean and variance estimators, respectively.
To correct for serial correlation, Hadri and Rao [2008] assume that b eit follows an AR(p) model as
follows:
b ei;t = ri;1b ei;t 1+ri;2b ei;t 2++ri;pib ei;t pi +ui;t: (18)
The LRV estimate of s2












where b ri(1) is the sum of all of the autoregressive coefﬁcients estimated in equation (18) and b s2
ui is
the LRV estimate of b ui, which can be estimated using a quadratic spectral window heteroscedastic6 JACOBO CAMPO - LUIS F. MELO
and an autocorrelation consistent estimator. The number of optimal lags, p, may be determined
using the Bayesian Schwarz selection criteria (SBIC).
Additionally, to correct for cross-sectional dependence among individuals, Hadri and Rao [2008]
follow the bootstrap methodology proposed by Maddala and Wu [1999]. They generate the errors,
b e
i;t, recursively from bootstrap innovations b u
i;t, as:
b e






it is obtained by adding b e
i;t to the deterministic component of the corresponding selected
model ((9), (10), (11) or (12)). The bootstrap procedure is repeated several times to derive the
empirical distribution of the LM statistic (17).
2.2.2. Westerlund cointegration test in a heterogeneous panel with multiple structural breaks and
cross-sectional dependence. The Westerlund [2006] cointegration test is an extension of the Mc-
Coskey and Kao [1998] test that allows for the presence of multiple structural breaks at both level
and trend. This methodology also accounts for cross-sectional dependence.




where xit = xi;t 1 +vit is a k dimensional I(1) vector that contains the regressors and zit is the
vector of the deterministic component2 and eit = rit +uit with rit = ri;t 1+fiuit. bi and gij are the
vectors of the parameters. The structural breaks are denoted with the subscript j = 1;2;:::;Mi+1.
These breaks are located at Ti;1;:::;Ti;M, where Ti;0 = 1 and Ti;Mi+1 = T. Cross-sectional indepen-
dence is assumed in the vector wit = (uit;v0
it)
0, 3 where wij and wkt are independent for all j, t and
i 6= k. Additionally, it is assumed that wij =Ci(L)eit
4 and the matrix Wi Ci(1)Ci(1)
0
is positive
deﬁnite [see Assumption 1 in Westerlund [2006] ].
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If fi = 0, then xit and yit are cointegrated. In this test, the null and alternative hypotheses can be
written as follows:
2Westerlund [2006] considers ﬁve cases of deterministic components: 1) zit = fg, 2) zit = f1g, 3) zit = f1;tg0, 4)
and 5) correspond to cases 2) and 3) with structural breaks.
3This assumption is later relaxed.
4L is the lag operator,Ci(L) < ¥ and eit  i:i:d:(0;IK+1).SUSTAINABILITY OF LATIN AMERICAN FISCAL DEFICITS 7
H0 : fi = 0 for i = 1;2;:::;N
HA : fi 6= 0 for i = 1;2;:::;N1 and fi = 0 for i = N1+1;N1+2;:::;N




















where Sit = å
t
s=Tij+1b eis and b eit is an efﬁcient estimate of eit in (20). This can be obtained with the
Fully Modiﬁed OLS methodology (FMOLS) of Phillips and Hansen [1990]. The structural breaks
are determined endogenously by Bai and Perron [2003]’s procedure.5 The limiting distribution of
this test is normal. However, Westerlund [2006] uses a bootstrap methodology to incorporate the
effect of cross-sectional dependence among countries.
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The data used in this paper come from the Oxford Latin American economic history database
(OxLAD) and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). It con-
tains annual information on revenues and primary expenditures as a share of the GDP for 8 Latin
American countries: Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay,
during the period of 1960-2009.6
3.1. Estimation results. The results of the Hadri and Rao [2008] panel unit root and the Wester-
lund [2006] cointegration tests are presented below.
3.1.1. Panel unit root test results. In this subsection, the Hadri and Rao [2008] stationarity test
is implemented. Tables 1 and 2 contain the results of the unit root tests for revenues and primary
expenditures as a share of GDP. In column 2 of each table, the selected model ((9), (10), (11)
or (12)) is presented; in columns 3 and 4, the optimal lag number of the autoregressive process
in equation (18) and the estimated LM individual statistic (KPSS) are shown, respectively.7 Five
thousand replications were used for the bootstrap methodology.8














6Brazil, Bolivia and Venezuela were excluded due to inconsistencies when compared with other data sources.
7The number of lags and the deterministic component of the models were selected using the Bayesian Information
Criteria (SBIC).
8The authors acknowledge Professor Yao Rao for kindly providing his GAUSS code, which was later written in R.8 JACOBO CAMPO - LUIS F. MELO
The results showed that the null hypothesis of stationarity for both series is rejected at a 5%
signiﬁcance level, which means that revenues and primary expenditures have a unit root.9




Country Model AR lag LM statistic
Argentina 3 3 0.1479
Chile 3 1 0.0548
Colombia 2 3 0.0811
Ecuador 3 1 0.0517
Panama 3 1 0.0421
Paraguay 3 1 0.0584
Peru 3 1 0.0256
Uruguay 1 1 0.0742




Country Model AR lag LM statistic
Argentina 3 1 0.0846
Chile 3 1 0.0278
Colombia 1 0 0.0742
Ecuador 2 1 0.1338
Panama 3 0 0.1491
Paraguay 0 1 0.0572
Peru 1 1 0.0379
Uruguay 3 2 0.0694
9The results of the panel unit root test in ﬁrst differences conﬁrm that the series in levels are I(1). These results are
not shown but are available on request.SUSTAINABILITY OF LATIN AMERICAN FISCAL DEFICITS 9
Given that both series are non-stationary, the next step of the methodology is to check whether
there is a long run relationship between them.
3.1.2. Panel cointegration results. Tables 3, 4 and 5 show the results of the cointegration test pro-
posed by Westerlund [2006].10 The ﬁrst column of each table presents the estimated structural
breaks and the second shows the result of the cointegration test. The estimated long run coefﬁ-
cients are presented in the third column. In addition, Figures1 and 2 show government revenues
and primary expenditures for the 8 Latin American countries that were considered along with the
estimated breaks. To take cross-sectional dependence into account, a block bootstrap method with
geometrical distribution was used with a block size of 5 and 5000 simulations. Given the sam-
ple size, the cointegration methodology considers 3 breaks per country at most. Furthermore, the
residuals of (20) are estimated by FMOLS.
As shown in Table 3, Argentina exhibits the most breaks in the cointegration relationship, whereas
Peru reports none. In contrast, Chile, Panama and Paraguay present two breaks each and Colom-
bia, Ecuador and Uruguay each have only one.
TABLE 3. Structural breaks estimated by the cointegration test
Country Number of Break 1 Break 2 Break 3 Breaks
Argentina 3 1969 1976 2002
Chile 2 1971 1988 -
Colombia 1 1990 - -
Ecuador 1 1984 - -
Panama 2 1973 1990 -
Paraguay 2 1988 2002 -
Peru 0 - - -
Uruguay 1 1971 - -
The estimated breaks partially reﬂect the history of the second part of the 20th century, which
was characterized by two stages of hyperinﬂation, monetary crises and dependent central banks.
These situations forced countries to focus their economic policies on stabilizing prices and the
exchange rate, apart from controlling public expenditures. Argentina’s case was characterized by
several military takeovers and dictatorial regimes. The 1969 break represents the disproportionate
rise of military expenditures due to the increasing political violence between 1965-1973. In 1976,
a national reorganization process began after the central government was overthrown, a situation
10The authors acknowledge Professor Joakim Westerlund for kindly providing his program of this test in GAUSS,
which was later written in R.10 JACOBO CAMPO - LUIS F. MELO
propitiated by General Jorge Rafael Videla. The 2002 break represents the default known as “El
Corralito”, which Argentina experienced after the massive leak of capitals that forced the govern-
ment of President Fernando de la R´ ua to freeze banking deposits (Cortes [2003]).
On the one hand, Chile was the ﬁrst Latin American country to enter the OECD (since 2010).
Military expenditures are a large share of its GDP in comparison with other countries in the region
(roughly 4%). In 2000, Chile implemented a ﬁscal rule to decrease the ﬁscal deﬁcit and keep it
at approximately 1% of GDP. Furthermore, the country is rich in copper (in 1970, copper made
up 60% of total Chilean exports). On the other hand, as shown in Figure 1, public expenditures
increased almost 36% in 1971 mainly due to a 48% increase in wages in the public sector. After
the ﬁnancial crisis of 1981 and the elimination of the ﬁxed exchange rate, Chile experienced an
11% recession from which it immediately recovered, as demonstrated by the average growth rate
of 7:5% between 1984 and 1989 (Meller [1996]). From another point of view, the estimated breaks
for Chile follow the Chilean military regime between 1973 and 1989.
Colombia exhibited a long period of moderate inﬂation, almost 45 years after the Second World
War. In 1989, its opening began after the Washington Consensus was signed. Likewise, in 1991 a
new Political Constitution was adopted that guaranteed the Central Bank its independence. These
two events may be related to the estimated break in 1990.
At the beginning of the 1970s, Ecuador was under civil dictatorship. In 1972, PetroEcuador was
created and the country entered the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). By
the 1980s, the crisis had deepened to the point of increasing Ecuador’s ﬁscal deﬁcit to approxi-
mately 2:3% in 1982. This was triggered by the commercial deﬁcit and falling oil prices. Nonethe-
less, in 1984, fuel prices increased dramatically, which in turn increased Ecuadorian oil revenues
as shown in Figure 1 (Spurrier [1986]).
Currently, Panama is one of the most globalized economies in Latin America. It has an investment
rating, is completely dollarized and the service sector is growing stronger. In 1968, it experienced
a military takeover, which gave way to General Torrijos’ dictatorship. In 1972, the new constitu-
tion increased health expenditures to more than 10% of the total national budget (ﬁrst break, see
Figure 2), which brought about an increase in total governmental expenditures. During 1988 and
1989, Panama experienced its most difﬁcult social and economic crisis ever.
Paraguay is a country characterized by military dictatorships. Alfredo Stroessner was president
for 35 years, between 1954 and 1989. In 1980, the treaty on Asociaci´ on Latinoamericana de In-
tegraci´ on (ALADI) was signed; in 1984, the largest hydroelectric power plant in the world, Usina
Hidroel´ ectrica de Itaip´ u, began operations. During 2001 and 2002, public expenditures registered
negative growth rates, mainly due to the reduction in social expenditures (roughly 50%). Accord-
ing to these estimations, Peru does not register any statistically signiﬁcant break.
Table 4 presents the results of the cointegration test for government revenues and primary ex-
penditures. Both the asymptotic and bootstrap p values are large enough not to reject the nullSUSTAINABILITY OF LATIN AMERICAN FISCAL DEFICITS 11
FIGURE 1. Structural breaks in the relationship between governmental revenues













































































































































































































Source: OXLAD and CEPAL.
hypothesis of cointegration at the 5 signiﬁcance level.




Table 5 reports the estimates of the long run coefﬁcients along with their standard deviations.
Given that these coefﬁcients are signiﬁcantly lower than 1 for the 8 countries that were studied,12 JACOBO CAMPO - LUIS F. MELO
FIGURE 2. Structural breaks in the relationship between governmental revenues








































































































































































































Source: OXLAD and CEPAL.
there is no ﬁscal sustainability in the strong sense, although according to Quintos [1995] it exists in
the weak sense. In this case, Chile, Panama and Paraguay exhibit the largest estimated coefﬁcients:
0:79, 0:72 and 0:66, respectively. In contrast, Colombia and Uruguay have the lowest coefﬁcients,
0:22 and 0:4811. The estimated coefﬁcients are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level, except in
the case of Peru.
11Lozano and Cabrera [2009] also found out that there is ﬁscal sustainability in the weak sense in the Colombian
case.SUSTAINABILITY OF LATIN AMERICAN FISCAL DEFICITS 13












There is sufﬁcient empirical evidence obtained through diverse methodologies of the relationship
between government expenditures and revenues to determine whether the government intertem-
poral budget constraint holds and, hence, whether its debt is sustainable in the long run. However,
over the last decade, several surveys that have attempted to demonstrate the former condition at the
regional level have appeared. These surveys arose from the need to incorporate two characteristics
that may be determinant when addressing this problem in the panel context: possible structural
breaks and cross-sectional dependence across individuals. The recent world crisis has pointed out
the importance of applying methodologies that take the former characteristic into account.
This document investigates the existence of the long run relationship between government primary
expenditures and revenues to prove whether a ﬁscal sustainability condition holds for Latin Amer-
ican countries. Annual series from Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, Paraguay
and Uruguay during 1960-2009 are used for data. The coefﬁcients of the long run relationship
are estimated by applying the second-generation cointegration panel test proposed by Westerlund
[2006], which incorporates cross-sectional dependence and multiple structural breaks.
The results suggest that primary expenditures and revenues exhibit common movements in the
long run. Nevertheless, the relationship between these variables is not 1 to 1. This condition
means that, although there is a long run relationship, the cointegration coefﬁcient is lower than 1.
According to Quintos [1995], this implies that ﬁscal sustainability only exists in the weak sense.
Therefore, if expenditures increase by 1%, revenues will increase less than 1% in the long term,
which means that the governments are spending more than they are collecting. Chile, Panama and
Uruguay exhibit the largest estimated coefﬁcients, whereas Colombia displays the lowest one. In
general, these results imply that the public ﬁnances of the 8 Latin American countries were weakly
sustainable between 1960 and 2009. They also suggest that these governments must be cautious
with their public ﬁnances.14 JACOBO CAMPO - LUIS F. MELO
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